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INTRODUCTION 
One of the most significant general economic developments of recent years 
In industrialized countIies has been the increasing OIientation of macroeconomic 
policies -and of monetary policies in particular- to achieving lower inflation rates. In 
some countIies, this trend has crystallized into legal refOIms establishing price 
stability as the plimalY goal of monetaIY policy, while at the same time granting 
extensive independence to central banks for achieving that goal. In other countries, 
even if there have been no specific legal changes, monetalY policy has been pursuing 
direct inflation targets in order to enhance the transparency of the authorities' 
commitment to plice stability. Finally, even in many of the counnies which have 
maintained their earlier legal nOlms and monetaIY policy an-angements, there has been 
a de facto strengthening of the anti-inflationary orientation of monetary policy. 
The above developments have been of paIiicular impoliance in recent years 
within the European Union (EU) in the context of the preparations to establish a fully 
fledged Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) in 1999. Accordingly, the 
convergence clitelia laid out in the Treaty of Maastricht to select future EMU 
pal1icipants specify that national inflation rates cannot be more than 1.5 p.p. higher 
than the average of the three lowest in the EU. FUl1hennore, the Statutes of the future 
European System of CentI'al Banks (ESCB) establish price stability as the plimalY 
goal of European monetary policy. 
At present, the annual inflation rate in the EU stands at 2.5%, a significant 
improvement from the 6-7% registered ten years ago. Nevertheless, since price 
stability is typically taken to mean an inflation rate of between 1 and 2%, and since 
almost all EU national central banks either already have price stability as the primary 
goal of monetalY policy -or will do under the Maasnicht Treaty provisions sometime 
in 1998-, it is envisaged that further disinflation will be a major policy goal in 
Europe. For this reason, it is of the foremost impOliance that an attempt be made to 
properly estimate the costs and benefits in moving from low inflation to plice 
stability. 
The purpose of this paper is to conduct such a cost-benefit analysis for the 
Spanish economy. In Spain, in spite of the long-lasting disinflationary process which 
stal1ed in the second half of the seventies, the average annual inflation rate still stood 
around 3.5% at the end of 1996, when this paper was written. If -for the sake of 
simplicity- we define price stability as the mid-point of the 1 and 2% inflation range 
(1.5%), then moving from low inflation to price stability implies a further lowering 
of inflation of about 2 p.p.(l). 
While we have followed the above route for the sake of comparability with 
the other countly studies in this volume, admittedly there is some uncertainty about 
the inflation rate that exactly constitutes plice stability in the case of Spain. If, for 
example, it were to be considered that an inflation rate of 2% -rather than 1.5%- more 
adequately represents plice stability, then going from low inflation to price stability 
would mean a fu11her lowering of inflation by 1.5 p.p. rather than 2 p.p. In such case, 
the costs and benefits estimates to be presented in the paper could be easily rescaled. 
Because the channels though which inflation affects the economy are multiple 
and highly complex (see Fischer and Modigliani, 1978, and Fischer, 1994), any 
empirical analysis of the gains and losses to be made when lowering inflation is 
necessarily bound to be partial and highly speculative. The route taken in this paper 
-within the framework of the NBER Project on "The Costs and Benefits of Achieving 
Price Stability"- consists of making a macroeconomic estimate of the costs, and a 
microeconomic estimate of the benefits, of moving from low inflation to price 
stability in Spain. Regarding the costs, we evaluate the output losses through 
estimates of the well-known sacrifice ratios. Regarding the benefits, we follow 
Feldstein's (1996) approach and focus on the distortions resulting from the interaction 
between inflation and the Spanish tax system. 
The main virtue of the approach followed in the paper is to make a compact 
and relatively homogeneous comparison between the costs and benefits of achieving 
price stability. Its main pitfall is that by focusing on the interactions between inflation 
and the tax system it ignores some of the channels through which lowering inflation 
might convey economic benefits. All in all, however, the assessment provided in this 
paper is a useful starting point for ascertaining whether policies geared towards 
achieving price stability in Spain are justified from the standpoint of the general 
interests of society. 
(1) An inflation rate of 1.5% probably comes close to being the upper bound of 
what we guess could be the measurement bias in the Spanish CPI. Unfortunately, 
there are no specific estimates of this bias to be reported for Spain. 
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The rest of the paper is structured as follows. Section 1 assesses the likely 
economic costs of reducing inflation by 2 p.p. in Spain by estimating a simple 
two-equation macro-model of inflation and unemployment. Section 2 calculates the 
size of the likely economic benefits of reducing inflation by 2 p.p., taking into 
account the main sources of interaction between inflation and the Spanish tax system. 
The concluding section compares costs and benefits and makes an overall assessment 
of the magnitude of the net benefits to be gained in achieving plice stability. 
1. l\1EASURING THE COSTS OF DISINFLATION 
The purpose of this section is to estimate the 'sacrifice ratio' for the Spanish 
economy; ie. how much output will be lost by each percentage point of pelmanent 
reduction in inflation. 
Because the relevant relationship that we seek to identify is what will be the 
real impact of a permanent reduction in inflation induced by a contraction in 
aggregate demand, it is imp0l1ant to have a model which can distinguish between 
supply and demand shocks. For this purpose, we adapt to the Spanish economy the 
general framework proposed by King and Watson (1994) with the modifications 
introduced by Dolado et a1. (1996). While the model explores the dynamics of 
inflation and unemployment, its results regarding the sacrifice ratio can be easily 
translated into output losses through Okun's law. 
As Figure 1 shows, the evolution of inflation and unemployment in Spain is 
rather different before and after 1979. Before 1979, there were peliods when inflation 
and unemployment moved in the same direction as a result of supply shocks. 
Thereafter, inflation and unemployment generally show an inverse relationship. For 
the sake of precision, Table 1 reports means, standard deviations and correlations for 
vadous sub-intervals in the 1964:1-1995:IV peliod. The stagflationary episodes are 
clearly shown in the first three peliods. In the rest, the cOITelations between inflation 
and unemployment are negative, with the exception of the 1986-1991 period where 
no con'elation is present. However, because these simple correlations are dominated 
by both demand and supply shocks, they are not informative about the nature of the 
ddving forces behind them. To disentangle the sources of these correlations and 
analyze the implicit Phillips curve trade-offs following a shock in aggregate demand 
we estimate a simple, but rather informative, empirical macro-model. 
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The basic model is that of King and Watson (1994), and consists of the 
following two structural relationships: 
p p 
Il n, = oil u, + E alt,,; Il n'-j + E a""J Il u,-j + Es, 
j=i j=i 
(1) 
p p 
Il u, = All n, + E a,mj Il nt-j + E aUJ,; Il u,-j + Edt j=i j=i 
(2) 
Equation (1) can be interpreted as an aggregate supply equation (Phillips curve) 
where inflation depends on unemployment -past and present- as well as lagged values 
of inflation. The term I Es/ is the "supply" shock. Equation (2) can be interpreted as 
an aggregate demand equation where unemployment depends on -present and past-
inflation and past unemployment. The telm 'Edt'is the "demand" shock. 
The vaIiables in the equations are expressed in first-difference form since ~ 
and 1tt show clear signs of unit-root behaviour and are non-cointegrated over the 
sample period. Under the present specification, the "long-run" effects of disturbances 
'Ed/ and' Est' are estimated, and the "saclifice ratio" computed as: 
when Il n'+k = 1 for k .... CXl 
Naturally, a preliminary step to be discussed is how the plimitive shocks are 
estimated since the previous structural system is not identified. Thus, as is standard 
in the V AR literature, we estimate the reduced fOlm V AR model 
Iln, = a (L) Ilu t _t + b (L) Ilnt-! + e1!l (3) 
(4) 
and recover the structural shocks from the residual in (3)-(4). To do so, we assume 
as customary that the demand and supply-shocks are orthogonal plus the following 
restriction: in the long run, inflation is purely a monetary phenomenon, i.e. the long-
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mn stochastic trend of inflation is govemed only by demand shocks!2l. Nevel1heless, 
it should be noticed that the latter restriction does not necessarily impose a fully 
vertical Phillips curve in the long mn. Whether this is the case or not in reality will 
be revealed by the empirical estimates(3). 
The model is estimated for Spain for the period 1964:I-1995:IV{41, yielding 
concrete results regarding the unemployment costs of pelmanently bringing down 
inflation at different horizons. In particular, after five years the long-run 'sacrifice 
ratio' (in telms of higher unemployment per 1 p.p. reduction in inflation) is 1.3. 
Using Okun's law (around 2.0 for Spain) to express the 'sacrifice ratio' in terms of 
cumulative output losses (every five years) per 1 p.p. of inflation reduction, it 
becomes 2.6. This implies that cost of reducing inflation by 2 p.p. in Spain is about 
1 % of GDP per year, its permanence being due to the existence of full hysteresis{S). 
In order to assess how reasonable our estimates are, it is useful to look at the -
unfortunately not very abundant- evidence obtained by other authors regarding the 
sacrifice ratio in Spain (see Table 2). In a recent paper, Andres, Valles and Mestre 
(1996) make use of a small qual1erly macroeconometric model to compute the 
sacrifice ratio of pelmanentiy reducing inflation in Spain by 2 p.p. They conclude that 
these costs are about 0.9% of GDP per year on a pelmanent basis, which is very 
similar to the 1 % of GDP we find in the monetarist case. Other authors, however, 
obtain once-and-for-all (rather than pelmanent) output costs. For example, according 
(2) While other identifying restrictions were consider which were closer in spirit 
to 'keynesian' or 'real business cycle' models, the 'monetarist' restl;ctions considered 
in the text seemed to be more reasonable. See Dolado, Lopez-Salido and Vega (1996) 
for a compalison between the three cases. 
(3) This IS so since the long-run Phillips trade-off, 
i . e .1im (11 U 1+k/ 11 E dl ) / ( 11 IT1+k/ 11 E dl ) w hen t .... 00, i s e q u a I t 0 
[d + (l-b)S]/[(l-c) + as] where a, b, c and d are the gains of the lag 
polynomials a(L), bel), c(L) and del) in equations (3 )-(4), and S = 1/6. It is easy 
to check that the monetarist case corresponds to S = o. Thus, even ifS = 0, the 
trade-off differs from zero unless d=O. 
(4) The VAR is estimated using first differences of EU12 inflation and 
unemployment rates as conditioning variables. 
(5) In the Spanish case, there is ample evidence of full hysteresis nowadays, with 
the proportion of workers unemployed for spells longer than a year (two years) close 
to 60% (40%). 
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by 2 p.p. would lead in Spain to a cumulative total output loss of slightly less· than 
2% of GDP. Neveltheless, as the author himself acknowledges, this estimate is based 
on the 'a priori' assumption of no hysteresis, which seems to be at odds with much 
of the empirical evidence for Spain. Indeed, in another paper, Ball (1996) himself 
presents cross-sectional empirical evidence which suggests that hysteretic effects have 
been common in OEeD countries during recent disinflationary episodes. His results 
suggest that a permanent reduction in inflation of 2 p.p. comes with a pelmanent 
annual output loss of about 1.1 % of GD P -a number remarkably close to the 1 % 
estimated with our small macro-model. 
So far, we have relied on the sacrifice ratio computed from the estimated 
two-variable model for the Spanish economy which was presented in equations (1) 
to (4). Neveltheless, a controversial and somewhat discomforting implication of the 
model is that there seems to be a pelmanent Phillips curve trade-off even under the 
sensible assumption that inflation is purely a monetary phenomenon in the long-run. 
Therefore, it is impOltant to explore whether this result is robust or not to changes 
in the specification of the model. 
As pointed out by Evans (1994), it may be the case that what this sort of 
model identifies as demand shocks are not necessarily (nominal) monetary shocks but 
a mixture of the latter and (preference) consumption shocks or fiscal policy shocks. 
Since our framework so far consists of a two-valiable system we are just able to 
identify pooled demand shocks. Thus, to disentangle a pure 'monetary' shock, one 
possibility is to add a third variable (~) to the system which contains information 
about 'non-monetary' shocks so that Edl can be interpreted appropriately. Empirically 
this is done by adding lagged values of ~ to the system (1 )-(2), allowing ~ to be 
influenced by contemporaneous values of ~ and ITl in its O\vn equation (technically 
the Oliginal demand and supply shocks are treated as \Vold causally prior to the third 
shock). We considered several candidates for ~ and found logged government current 
expenditure (in second differences) as a suitable one. In this case we found that the 
long-run trade-off was marginally insignificant, giving rise to a cumulative transitory 
loss of output of 10 percent of GDP per 2 p.p. of inflation reduction. These numbers 
are about twice those taken by Feldstein (1996) as representative of the total output 
cost for the US, which seems about right given the significantly larger increases in 
unemployment registered in the Spanish case during past disinflatonary episodes. 
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As shown, new results ansmg from attempting to distinguish between 
monetary and non-monetary shocks yield very different implications regarding 
whether a 10ng-IUn trade-off between inflation and unemployment exists (ie. whether 
the output costs are transitory or permanent). Nevertheless, it is interesting to note 
that for the purposes of the exercise we want to pelfonn in this paper this very 
cIUcial conceptual difference can be easily taken into account from an empirical 
viewpoint. This can be seen once we express the total transitory output costs of 
moving to price stability (l0% of GDP) in terms of an annual stream of costs with 
the same present value, which we can later compare to the annual stream of benefits 
to be estimated in Section 3. As in Feldstein, the discount rate that we use to perform 
the above calculation is the difference between the average after-tax real rate of return 
that an individual investor received from investing in the stock market (9.5% in the 
Madlid Stock Exchange in the 1985-95 period) and the average real growth rate of 
the economy (2.5% in Spainy6l. This yields an equivalent pelmanent annual stream 
of costs of 0.6% of GDP, which is significantly below the pelmanent annual loss of 
1 % of GDP estimated with the original version of the model. 
Thus, while there may be some controversy about whether the costs of moving 
from low inflation to price stability in Spain are transitory or permanent, and while 
recognizing that this as yet unsettled empilical issue has profoundly different 
conceptual implications for one's view of how the economy works, for our purposes 
it amounts to taking an annual cost estimate of 0.6% of GDP in the transitory case 
and 1 % of GDP in the pelmanent case. Taking a conservative stance, in what follows 
we will consider that going from low inflation to price stability in Spain will be 
worthwhile insofar as the benefits involved in such a move are at least between 0.6-
1 % of GDP per year on a pelmanent basis (see Table 2). 
It can be reasonably claimed that the estimates that we and other researchers 
obtain for the sacrifice ratio in Spain may underestimate the true output costs of 
going from low inflation to price stability since these costs are likely to increase as 
the inflation rate gets lower (ie. the Phillips curve gets flatter). On the other hand, 
there are also reasons to believe that histOlical estimates of the sacrifice ratio may 
overall significantly overestimate the actual costs of disintlation to be faced by the 
(6) See Section 3 for the derivation of the discount rate. While the cummulated 
output loss is 10% of GDP, its present value is 9.1% of GDP. Thus, (0.07)(9.1) = 
0.64% of GDP. 
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Spanish authorities nowadays. Firstly, our expelience has been that with sufficiently 
low rates of inflation indexation mechanisms are deactivated, which enhances relative 
price and real wage flexibility. And secondly, the disinflationary expeIiences of the 
past -on which econometIic estimates are based- took place in a context characterized 
by a high degree of regulation in goods and factor markets, a lack of central bank 
independence and an internally unbalanced macroeconomic policy mix. Very likely, 
this exacerbated the output costs of 10weIing inflation by reducing the credibility of 
the disinflationary strategies pursued and by increasing the degree of downward wage 
and price rigidity. 
Nowadays the Spanish economy is considerably more open and flexible, 
mainly as a result of its integration into the European Union since 1986. In addition, 
the anti-inflationary reputation of the monetaIY authorities has been significantly 
enhanced, the Banco de Espafia has been granted an independent status, and the 
macroeconomic policy mix has become much more balanced as a result of progress 
in fiscal consolidation. Other things being equal, this makes it reasonable to expect 
that the actual cost of moving from low inflation to price stability will now be 
significantly lower than in the past given the strengthened anti-inflationary credibility 
of macro policies and the greater flexibility of the overall economic structure. 
That this may indeed be the case is reflected in the performance of the 
economy in the last few years, where progress on the inflationary front has been 
achieved with a much better overall economic perfOlmance than normally experienced 
in previous similar cyclical situations. For all the above reasons, our impression is 
that the cost estimate of 0.6 to 1 % of GDP per year that we use as a benchmark for 
compaIison with benefits very probably overestimates to some extent the true costs 
involved in moving towards price stability in Spain at present. If, as shown in the 
next section, the annual benefits do in fact exceed even this conservative cost 
estimate, it could be claimed with some confidence that going towards price stability 
in Spain is a worthy enterpIise. 
2. MEASURING THE BENEFITS OF GOING TO PRICE STABILITY 
According to the analysis presented above, in Spain the benefits of achieving 
price stability outweigh the costs if the annual benefit of lower inflation is at least 
worth 0.6 to 1 % of GDP. 
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\Vhile an attempt to evaluate all the benefits associated with moving from low 
inflation to ptice stability would certainly be ideal (see Viiials, 1997), we follow the 
more modest -but more feasible- route of simply assessing the benefits stemming 
from the inter-relationship between inflation and the tax system(7). In what follows, 
we apply Feldstein's (1997) fi·amework to the Spanish economy, taking into account 
the peculialities of the Spanish tax system. We consider those effects related to the 
lifetime allocation of consumption, to housing demand, to the demand for money and 
to the debt service. The total effects on each of these items will be decomposed into 
the direct effect of the reduced dist0l1ions and the associated welfare effects of the 
corresponding revenue changes. 
2.1. Inflatioll a/ld the /ntel'te111porai Allocation of Consumption 
A reduction in the rate of return that individuals earn on their saving, due to 
increases in effective tax rates at the corporate level and at the individual level, 
implies distortions in the allocation of consumption between the early years of 
working life and the age of retirement. Since the existence of tax laws creates such 
a distortion even in the presence of price stability, the extra dist0l1ion caused by 
inflation causes a first-order deadweight loss. In addition, there are associated effects 
on government revenue which need to be taken into account since a loss (gain) of 
revenue would have to be offset through increases (reductions) in other distortionary 
taxes. In what follows, we evaluate first the traditional welfare gain, and then turn to 
assess the additional welfare effect of changes in tax revenue. 
2.1.1. Welfare gain from reduced distortions in illtertemporai consumption 
Following FeIdstein (1996), the direct welfare gain from reducing inflation is 
computed making use of a simple two-peliod model of individual consumption. In 
such a model individuals earn income when young, and save a portion for retirement 
consumption by investing in a p0l1folio that earns a real net-of-tax return (r). 
Considering that individuals retire on average after T years, then the price of 
retirement consumption (P) which is purchased through saving is inversely related to 
the real rate of return. As the negatively sloping compensated demand curve in Figure 
(7) Notice that these benefits atise from lowering the rate of inflation even if it is 
perfectly anticipated. 
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2 shows, the amount of retirement consumption (C) purchased by individuals 
becomes lower when its price l;ses. Because inflation interacts with the tax system 
to increase the effective tax rate on capital income and thus to reduce the real 
net-of-tax retum to individual savers, the higher the inflation rate, the higher the price 
of retirement consumption (P2>PI) and the lower the demand for retirement 
consumption (C2<CI) relative to the optimal situation of no inflation and no taxes 
(Po,CoY S1 • 
As explained in Feldstein's analysis, the welfare gain from inflation reduction 
to an individual who saves while working and retires and consumes the retum on his 
savings after retirement, can be expressed as the sum of niangle B and rectangle D 
under his compensated demand curve for retirement consumption in the Figure. 
Using the standard Slutsky decomposition of the uncompensated change 
between compensated and income effects, the welfare gain (with taxes but no 
inflation) can be expressed as: 
Deadweight gain = GI = [PI -Po + ~_P_2 -_P_I 
P2 2 P2 
where Pi is the price of retirement consumption: 
Pi = (1 +rJ30 (i = 0,1,2) 
and the subscripts correspond to the following cases: 
(0) = no inflation and no taxes 
(1) = taxes and no inflation 
(2) = taxes and inflation 
(5) 
S2 is savings during pre-retirement years at the existing inflation rate; a = as2/ i1y 
is the marginal propensity to save out of exogenous income, and Tlsp is the 
uncompensated elasticity of savings with respect to the price of retirement 
consumption. 
(8) Throughout the text we refer to 'no inflation' or 'price stability' as a situation 
when the actual inflation rate is 1.5%, as stated in Section 1. 
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To evaluate the annual pelmanent welfare gain 0 1 we must first measure the 
price of retirement consumption in the three situations described (0, 1 and 2) . 
. To calculate the price of retirement consumption in the absence of inflation 
and taxes (Po), we need an estimate of the real pre-tax return to capital. From 1985 
to 1995, the median real return to capital in the Spanish manufacturing sector 
averaged 11.9%, according to company accounts of Central de Balances (Banco de 
Espafia, 1996ay9). Thus, 
Po = [1.119]"30 = 0.0343 
. To estimate the real net-of-tax return to savers in a world of taxes and 
inflation (P2)' we need to take into account the effects of the existence of corporate 
and personal taxes. Between 1988 and 1995, taxes (net of deductions) paid by 
corporations averaged 23% ofpre-tax returns (including interest payments). Corporate 
income taxation operates under an imputation system which mitigates the double 
taxation of dividends at the shareholder level. Dividends carry a tax credit of 40% of 
the amount received by the shareholder. The tax credit is included in the income tax 
base, and it is deductible from the computed individual income tax. In the 
computation of the effective tax rate on company profits, we have netted out these 
deduction payments. From 1985 to 1995, dividends averaged 18% of pr eta x profits 
(Banco de Espafia, 1996a). Thus, the after-tax rate of return is 11.9(1-
0.23)(1+0AxO.18), where the second term in brackets reflects the estimated amount 
of dividend tax credits that individuals can deduct against their tax liabilities. This 
leaves an after-corporate-tax return of 9.82%. 
The after-tax rate of return to savers also depends on personal taxes. Spanish 
personal income taxation treats capital incomes differently, in a way that depends on 
how income is received. A taxpayer with average taxable income pays a statutory 
marginal tax rate of 30%, which is the rate fal1ing on interest receipts. For dividends, 
we can use a marginal effective tax rate of 1.4(30%)=42%, since the imputation tax 
credit is liable to taxes. FinaIly, the effective tax rate on capital gains can be 
calculated as in King (1977) and Bakhshi et al. (1996). Real capital gains are taxed 
(9) We take the median since the average was severely distorted by huge outIiers. 
This figure does not differ markedly from the real net return to business capital 
calculated by DECD for Spain: 14.1% on average over the 1985-1995 period. 
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at a fixed rate of 20% upon realization. The effective tax rate is 20%[<1>(1 +i)/( <I>+i)] , 
where <I> is the fraction of accrued capital gains realised every period and i is the 
investor's discount rate, which is the after-tax rate of return to stocks. From company 
accounts of Central de Balances (Banco de Espafia, 1996a), the dividends-net assets 
ratio between 1985 and 1995 averaged 2.1 %. In the same years, stocks quoted on the 
Madrid Stock Exchange paid an average dividend of 5.8%. Here we use an 
intermediate figure: 4%. Over 1985-1995, the Madrid Stock Exchange Index rose by 
12.2% on average in nominal terms, or 8.1 % [12.2-(5.6-1.5)] in real terms. Thus: 
i = (l-0.42)x4% + [1-0.2x<l>(I+i)/(<I>+i)]x8.1% 
The solution for i is 9.5% for <1>=0.1 or 9.2% for <1>=0.2. In the absence of infOImation 
on the "hue" value of <1>, we take <1>=0.1, which yields an estimate of the effective 
marginal tax rate on real capital gains of around 11 %. 
In order to compute an aggregate marginal tax rate, we need weights for 
marginal tax rates falling on interest, dividends and capital gains. From Central de 
Balances, the average debt-capital ratio for companies between 1985 and 1995 was 
close to 50%, a split which we use also for individuals{IO). On the other hand, the 
above figures on average dividends and real capital gains imply a dividends/capital 
gains split of 33/67. Therefore, the aggregate personal tax rate on corporate after-tax 
profits is: 
0.5x30% + 0.5[0.33x42%+0.67x11 %] = 25.6% 
This tax rate implies a net real return to savers of (l-0.256)x9 .82%=7.31 %. Therefore, 
the associated price of retirement consumption is: 
P2 = [1.0731]'30 = 0.1204 
According to our calculations, the joint presence of inflation and taxes leads 
to a significant wedge between the before- and after-tax real rate of return to 
(10) An issue which deserves closer attention is the role of tax-privileged 
savings vehicles. In 1995, direct holdings of firms' bonds, loans and stocks were less 
than 50% of total net financial assets held by households. On the other hand, the 
effective tax rate on other assets varies widely, a feature that is magnified when 
inflation increases (Gonzalez-Paramo, 1991). 
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individual savers. In particular, this return drops from 11.9% to 7.3%, inducing an 
increase in the price of retirement consumption from 0.0343 to 0.1204 . 
. We can now go on to calculate what the real rate of return would be in a 
world of taxes and no inflation (pJ For this we need to specify some additional tax 
infOlmation. Profit is taxed with a national tax rate of 35%. Interest payments are 
deductible. Capital gains are taxed at the corporation tax rate. Allowances for 
depreciation are available. Corporations may use the straight-line depreciation method 
(which is the only one available for buildings) and two variants of the declining 
balance method ("sum-of-the-years-digits" and "constant percentage"); switch-over is 
not allowed. From 1996 on, capital gains are pal1ially indexed, and inventOlies can 
be valued using the UFO method. 
Consider a reduction in inflation of 2 p.p. For corporations, this has two 
opposing effects. First, since nominal debt interest payments are tax-deductible, a 
two-point decline in inflation raises the effective tax rate on profits. For a given real 
pre-tax cost of bOlTowing, and a debt-capital ratio of 50%(11), the effective tax rate 
would increase by 0.35(0.5)(0.02)=0.0035, or 0.35 p.p. On the other hand, since 
depreciation allowances are not indexed, a 2 p.p. reduction in inflation lowers taxable 
profits by increasing the real value of the tax-deductible depreciation. We do not have 
an independent estimate of this effect comparable to that provided by Auerbach 
(1978) for the US. However, available estimates of the overall effect of inflation upon 
the effective tax rate on company profits broadly coincide: a 2 p.p. reduction in the 
rate of inflation leads to a fall in the effective tax rate of about 0.1 p.p. In a 
comparative study of effective tax rates in developed countries, OECD (1991) finds 
that a 5 p.p. reduction in inflation is associated with a 0.5 p.p. fall in taxable profits 
in the case of Spain. In a more detailed analysis, Sanz (1994) evaluates effective tax 
rates in a sample of 883 private industIial companies(12). He estimates that moving 
from 5% inflation to price stability causes the effective tax wedge to fall by 
approximately 1.1 p.p .. Given a fixed capital stock, this means that pre-tax profits fall 
by 0.22 p.p. per 1 p.p. decline in inflation. Thus, a 2 p.p. reduction in inflation raises 
(11) Data from Central de Balances 1995 (Banco de Espafia, 1996a). 
(12) Help by J.F. Sanz with these calculations is much appreciated. 
N196026.\1:MM 13 
the net-of-tax corporate retum by 0.35(0.22)(0.02)=0.0015 or 0.15 p.p.(13). That is, 
the net effect of achieving plice stability is to raise the rate of retum after corporate 
taxes from 9.82% to 9.97%. 
To calculate a real net-of-tax retum to savers, we must consider the combined 
effect of taxes at the personal level. Applying the weighted personal tax rate to the 
9.97% retum after corporate taxes implies a net retum to savers of 7.42%. In 
addition, there is an independent effect of inflation channelled through the tax 
treatment of interest income(14). Taking the share of debt in individuals' portfolios 
to be the same as the debt-capital ratio of companies, a 2 p.p. fall in inflation reduces 
the effective tax rate by 0.3(0.5)(0.02)=0.003 or 0.3%. Adding to the new after-tax 
rate ofretum (7.42%) the gain to savers in the taxation of interest income (0.3%), we 
arrive at a net-of-tax retum to individuals of 7.72%, up 0.41 p.p. from the retum 
when inflation is 2 p.p. higher. Thus, the associated pIice of retirement consumption 
IS: 
PI = (l.0772y30 = 0.1074. 
Substituting the values of Po, PI' P2 in the expression for the welfare gain (5), 
we have: 
(6) 
Now we need to measure savings during pre-retirement years, the marginal 
propensity to save out of exogenous income, and the uncompensated elasticity of 
saving with respect to the price of retirement consumption to evaluate the welfare 
gain in equation (5). 
To provide an estimate of savings of the young at the existing rate of inflation, S2' 
Feldstein exploits the relationship between S2 and net personal savings, S~, in a 
steady-state growth path: 
(\3) Note that this estimate implies that the effect of inflation through depreciation 
allowances is a 0.71 % reduction in the taxable profits rate per additional 1% 
reduction in inflation. 
(14) Since nominal capital gains are indexed, changes in the rate of inflation do not 
affect capital gains taxes. 
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1 S2 = ------:: 
1-(1 +n +g) -T GDP 
S,v 
GDP (7) 
where n is population growth, g is the growth rate of real per capita wages, and T is 
the length of the working peliod in years. Over the 1985-1995 period, the growth of 
the wage bill in real terms was 2.8%, and the net personal savings rate averaged 5.0% 
of GDP (Banco de Espafia, 1996b). Taking T=30, this implies that savings of the 
young is 9% of GDP. However, recent evidence from the expenditure survey 
Encuesta de Presupuestos Familiares 1990-91 suggests that the foregoing figure is 
too Iow. Oliver, Raymond and Pujolar (1996) find that population cohorts spanning 
over the 35-65 year range save around 20% of their income. Since the personal 
income-GDP ratio has been quite stable around 0.7 over the 1985-1995 period, the 
implied saving ratio for the young is S2=14% of GDP. We use this estimate in our 
calcu1ations(15). 
In order to compute the welfare gain according to equation (5), we need 
estimates for the savings function parameters. Assuming that 0' equals the sensitivity 
of savings to wage income, O'=(S/GDP)/a, where a is the share of wages in GDP, 
which is around 0.66. Thus, for S/GDP=0.09, 0' is 0.135, and when S/GDP=0.14, 
0'=0.21 (16\ our chosen estimate. On the other hand, the elasticity of saving with 
respect to the price of retirement consumption can be calculated as in Feldstein 
(1995): 11sp=-(1+r) 11s/rT, where 11sr is the uncompensated savings elasticity with 
respect to after-tax real rate of return. 
Argim6n, Gonzalez-Paramo and Roldan (1993) estimate semi-elasticities of 
private consumption with respect to the real interest rate in the -0.2/0 range. For a 
given income, these elasticities are linked by the relationship: 11sr=-r(C/S) 11 cri where 
r is the real after-tax interest rate, C is personal consumption, S is private savings and 
11cr is the semi-elasticity of consumption with respect to the real interest rate. Taking 
r=6% and C/S=15.8 from National Accounts data, 11sr ranges between 0 and 0.2. With 
(15) Gross household savings over 1985-1995 was 10.8%, 1.5% higher than the 
corresponding ratio in the UK. Since 11 % is the lower bound of the savings ratio in 
the UK study, a 14% rate for Spain does not seem implausibly high. 
(16) These figures are within the range of the available econometric estimates. 
According to Marchante (1993), with an income elasticity of 0.85-0.90 and an 
average propensity to consume of 0.95,0' estimates fall in the 0.l4-0.19 interval. 
15 
r=4% and C/S=5, in line with expenditure surveys, the upper bound of these estimates 
would fall to 0.1. On the other hand, Estrada (1997) suggests even lower values for 
the savings elasticity (0.04). Thus we consider elasticities between 0 and 0.2 as 
reasonable estimates, and 0.4 for comparability with FeIdstein's calculations. 
Once we substitute the values for the different variables and parameters into 
equation (5), the associated welfare gains are: 
11 sr 11sp G1 (% of GDP) 
0 0 0.79 
0.2 -0.12 0.91 
0.4 -0.24 1.03 
In spite of the differences between the economic parameters and the tax systems of 
Spain and the US, the estimated pelmanent annual welfare gains from achieving price 
stability are remarkably similar. 
2.1.2. Welfare Revenue Effects of I.LJ1'Y'er Inflation 
\Vhen inflation is lower, the tax revenue collected may be higher or lower than 
initially depending on the induced change in retirement consumption along the 
compensated demand curve. If we start from a situation such as that depicted by point 
2 in Figure 2, with consumption C2 and price of retirement consumption P2' a 
reduction in inflation lowers the effective tax rate on the return to savings, which 
implies a revenue loss corresponding to rectangle E. At the same time, a lower price 
of future consumption stimulates retirement consumption, which in turn generates 
additional revenues, reflected by rectangle D. Thus, the overall net effect on revenue 
can be either positive or negative (D-E). Using again the uncompensated savings 
elasticity, since the young generally ignore the need to pay for future lost revenue 
(the compensated case), the aggregate revenue effect can be expressed as: 
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With the fOlmer parameter values computed in Section 2.1.1, the first effect 
dominates, generating the following revenue losses: 
l1sr l1sp dREV\ (% of GDP) 
0 0 -0.59 
0.2 -0.12 -0.48 
0.4 -0.24 -0.37 
These values are somewhat larger than those found for the US mainly as a result of 
differences in the savings ratio. 
Now we can convert these revenue losses into welfare losses by scaling them 
usmg a deadweight loss coefficient /... The value of /.. measures the marginal 
deadweight loss per peseta of additional revenue, and it depends on the specific taxes 
used to make up for the revenue losses. Feldstein (1996) uses two benchmark values: 
0.4 and 1.5. For the Spanish case, we can obtain estimates of /.. from the computable 
general equilibrium model calibrated by Kehoe and others (1989). An across-the-
board tax increase generating 100 pesetas of revenue produces a deadweight loss 
which is in the range of 29 to 47 pesetas(17). These figures are very similar to those 
of BalIard, Shoven and \\'halley (1985) used by Feldstein. We take as our central 
estimate .1..=0.4. For the sake of comparability, we also use .1..=1.5, an estimate which 
seems too high to us. 
With the two chosen values for A, the welfare revenue losses are: 
(17) We are grateful to Antonio Manresa and Femin Sancho for providing us 
calculations and guidance as to their interpretation. 
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1') sr 1')sp dREV\ (% of GDP) 
1..=0.4 1..=1.5 
0 0 -0.24 -0.88 
0.2 -0.12 -0.19 -0.72 
0.4 -0.24 -0.15 -0.56 
As can be seen, the magnitude of the welfare revenue losses is quite sensitive 
to the assumed value of the marginal deadweight loss. All in all, however, in all cases 
but one the direct welfare gain is higher than the indirect welfare revenue loss. 
The net welfare gain from reducing inflation by 2% is NG\=G\+l..dREV\. This 
fOlmula yields the following estimates (see first three rows of Table 3): 
NG\ (% of GDP) 
1') sr 1')sp 1..=0.4 1..=1.5 
0 0 0.55 -0.09 
0.2 -0.12 0.72 0.19 
0.4 -0.24 0.88 0.47 
For 1..=0.4, the range of estimates is around the size of US calculations. 
2.1.3. Pensions and nonsavers 
It must be noted that to the extent that individuals receive exogenous income 
during retirement (social secmity pensions), our annual estimates need to be adjusted 
downwards. With exogenous income B, retirement consumption is C=S/p+B, whereby 
1')cp =(1-k)( 1')sp-l), where 1')cp is the uncompensated elasticity of retirement consumption 
with respect to its own price and k=B/C is the benefit ratio for the relevant population 
(i.e. savers). This alters the welfare gain formula to G\=0.0714S2[(l-k)(1- 1')sp)-cr]. 
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In 1990(1~l, the benefit ratio for households with heads aged 65 and older 
was around 30%. However, 42% of them received the minimum pension, due to 
insufficient contributions over their working years. Presumably, most of these retired 
individuals made no savings when young and depend solely on their pension. 
Excluding this group reduces the implied estimate to k=20%, on the assumption that 
all of the remaining pensioners were young-age savers as well. To see how taking B 
into account would alter our estimate of G1, the following table summarizes the 
results for k=O and k=20%. 
G1 (% of GDP) 
11 sr 11sp k=O k=O.2 Change (%) 
0 0 0.79 0.59 -25 
0.2 -0.l2 0.91 0.69 -24 
0.4 -0.24 1.03 0.78 -24 
While the existence of pensions reduces the welfare gains as indicated, the increase 
in the return to savings may cause some non-savers to save, a change that would 
increase both welfare and revenues. Though the magnitude of this "participation" 
decision is potentially impOliant, reliable estimates are not readily available. Thus, we 
have no way to assess the net effect of these two adjustments and thus we stick to 
the estimates provided in the first three rows of Table 3. 
2.2. IlIflation alld Demand for Housillg 
2.2.1. Welfare gain from reduced distortions in Housing Demand 
Inflation distorts all fOlms of private housing demand through two mam 
channels. First, it reduces the net return of alternative assets, an effect which 
(18) According to Oliver, Raymond and Pujolar (1996), average expenditure of the 
4.2 million households with head aged 65 or older was slightly below 1.9 million 
pesetas. From official statistics, the average pension of the 3,241,908 old-age 
pensioners was 717,626 pesetas. A minimum pension of about 47,000 pesetas a 
month was received by 1,368,142 pensioners. 
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stimulates the demand for houses by all sectors or potential users: owner-occupiers, 
non-owner-occupiers (mainly, second residences) and landlords in the private rented 
sector. In addition, the tax advantages given to a large number of owner-occupiers 
and, to a lesser extent, to landlords, are magnified by inflation. In Spain, these tax 
plivileges are quite generous by international standards, particularly in the case of 
owner-occupied housing, and the size of the housing stock is also relatively large. 
Therefore, a reduction in the rate of inflation is quite likely to produce sizable welfare 
gains, through both a reduction of the distOltions caused by housing 
over-consumption and a reduction in tax revenue losses. 
The welfare gains discussed above can be readily illustrated with the help of 
Figure 3, which shows the compensated demand curve relating the quantity of 
housing to its rental cost. In Spain, as in so many other countlies, the effective 
subsidies to housing demand arising from the combination of inflation and the tax 
system reduce the implied rental cost of housing and thus lead to an 
over-consumption of housing (H2), compared to a situation of taxes but no inflation 
(HI) and of no taxes nor inflation (Ho). Following Feldstein (1996), since the real 
pre-tax cost of providing housing capital is Ro, the existence of taxes with no inflation 
yields a welfare loss shown by tliangle A. If on top of this there is also inflation, then 
the welfare loss increases by the areas C and D in the Figure. In what follows, we 
estimate the deadweight gains obtained by reducing inflation (from H2 to HI) for 
o\\l1er-occupied housing, non-owner occupied housing and rental housing. 
In the absence of any taxes, the user cost of housing, Ro, net of maintenance 
costs (m), and depreciation (8), must equal the real return to capital in the non-
housing sector (p), ie. Ro = m+8+ p. With m=2%, 8=2.2%(19) and p=I1.9% (the 
real pre-tax return to capital in the manufacturing sector), Ro=16.1 %. Next we 
proceed to analyze the effect of taxes and inflation upon the real rental cost, housing 
demand and tax revenues. 
One peseta of housing capital costs to a home-buyer (l-d)(l +r) pesetas, where 
ti=7% is the VAT tax rate on house purchases and d=15% is a tax credit given to 
owner-occupiers on the value of the house including taxes. Tax payers may enjoy this 
advantage five years in advance of the purchase on the amounts invested in "housing 
(19) Fundaci6n BBV (1996) assumes that 8 has increased from 1.5% in 1970 to 
2% in 1990, which implies an estimate of 0=2.2% for 1995. 
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savings accounts", and after the purchase on m0l1gage repayments. In order to qualify 
for the tax credit, the house must be the main residence of the owner and cannot be 
sold in three years. Home-owners pay income tax on an "imputed rental": P't'bZ per 
peseta of housing cost, where P=2% is the imputation rate, 't'b=42.5% is the weighted 
marginal tax rate of home-owners(20) and z=33% is the average ratio of the official 
tax value ("valor catastral") to the market value of the house (Gallego, 1995). Local 
property taxes (Jmpuesto sob re Bienes Inmuebles) are levied with an average rate 
't'p=1 % on the tax value of the house, and are deductible from the income tax base. 
Maintenance costs and depreciation are not deductible, and real capital gains are 
taxed unless the proceeds of the sale are reinvested in a new main residence. In 
addition, interest expenses are deductible in nominal terms at the marginal tax rate, 
with a ceiling of 1.6 million pesetas for a two-eamer household. Given a mortgage-to-
value ratio of 11=50%(21" an average plice of a new house of 17 million pesetas 
(Sociedad de Tasaci6n, SA, JanualY 1997) and the 1995 average mortgage interest 
im = 10.8%, the interest deduction ceiling is not likely to be binding in most cases. 
Finally, it is w0l1h noting that a large fraction of old houses do not benefit from tax 
pIivileged treatment, either because they where bought before 1979 (when the tax 
credit was introduced) and/or because m0l1gages have been paid off. 
With this descliption of the tax rules relevant to ovmer-occupiers with tax 
advantages, the user cost of housing can be expressed as: 
(9) 
where rn =7.31 % is the real after-tax rate of retum on other investments, 1'g =11 % is 
the effective tax rate on real capital gains, g= 1.1 % is the average real capital gain on 
housing between 1988 and 1995 according to Sociedad de Tasaci6n SA (5.4-4.3), and 
(20) Individual tax data suggest, according to Leal (1992), that 45% of the tax 
credit benefits taxpayers in the lichest 10% of family income, 25% of the benefits are 
reaped by the following 20% and the rest goes to the remaining 70% of total 
taxpayers. Applying these weights to marginal tax rates of 56%, 40% and 24.5% 
gives an average of 42.5%. 
(21) According to Banco de Espafia's (1 996b ) data on financial liabilities of 
households, this ratio appears to be somewhat smaller. However, loans between 
individuals or between families and individual firms cancel each other out within the 
personal sector. 
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7t=3.2% is the true rate of inflation in 1995. The computed rental is thus RA2=8.21 %. 
In order to evaluate the real return associated with a 2 p.p. reduction in the rate of 
inflation, RA I , we have that: 
dRA 
dn 
dim d(r +n) 
= (1-d)(1+T)[/-1(1-Th)- + (1-/-1) n - 1] = -0.29% dn dn 
where it is assumed that diJd7t=1 and dr/d7t=-0.21 stems from the fact that a 2 p.p. 
reduction in inflation raises the real after-tax return to savers from 7.31 % to 7.72%. 
These calculations imply RA I=8.79%. In the case of owner-occupiers without tax 
advantages, expression (9) simplifies to: 
The resulting cost is RW2=11. 77%. On the other hand, since dRW/d1t=(l +r)(dr/d1t)=-
0.23, a 2 p.p. reduction in inflation raises the user cost to RW I=12.23%. 
Before evaluating the welfare effects, we need an estimate of the value of the 
housing stock and a value for the compensated elasticity of housing demand with 
respect to the rental pIice. Jaen and Molina (1994 a and b) provide econometric 
estimates which imply a compensated price elasticity of 0.9, with no significant 
differences between owner-occupied housing and rental housing. We assume that this 
elasticity applies to all fOlms of housing demand decisions. As to the value of the 
housing stock, Fundaci6n BBV (1996) estimates a net stock of accumulated 
investment in housing of 117% of GDP. Given that land values represent on average 
30% of total cost (Sociedad de Tasaci6n SA, Janual)' 1977), the former estimate must 
be raised to 170% of GDP. An altemative calculation, based on data of average 
square meters per house and number of houses (INE, Censo de Poblaci6n y 
Viviendas, various years), and average market pIices per square meter (Ministerio de 
Obras Publicas y Urbanismo and Sociedad de Tasaci6n SA), yields an estimate of 
158.3 billion pesetas, i.e. 227% of 1995 GDP(22). 
In order to decompose this figure among house uses we can refer to the shares 
of owner-occupiers, non-owner-occupiers and rental houses: 76.55%, 10.45% and 
13%, respectively. Assuming that non-owner-occupied houses (second residences and 
empty houses) have a price which is on average one half of the value of owner-
(22) Assistance with these calculations was kindly provided by Angel Estrada. 
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occupied and rental houses, the adjusted shares in the housing stock are: owner-
occupied housing, 80.77%; non-O\vner-occupied housing, 5.51 %; and rental housing, 
13.72%. On the other hand, in 1994 there were 8.5 million taxpayers who declared 
housing income, of which 3.2 million -or 38%- claimed tax credits (Agencia Estatal 
de Administraci6n Tributaria, 1996). Since houses without tax advantages are old 
houses, with lower selling plices, a further adjustment is needed in order to 
disaggregate the value of owner-occupied housing according to tax status. From 
professional repOlts based on market valuations (TINSA, february 1997), the average 
value of a house of 10 years or older is 30% below the value of equivalent houses 
built more recently. Thus, the value of the housing stock enjoying tax-privileged 
treatment can be scaled upwards to 46.7% of owner-occupied housing. Following 
these adjustments, stock values of owner-occupied houses with and without tax 
advantages are HA2=85.6% of 1995 GDP and HW2=97.8% ofGDP, respectively. The 
remaining stock values are HN2=12.5% ofGDP for non-owner-occupied housing and 
HR2=31.1 % of GDP for rental housing. 
Let us return to owner-occupiers enjoying tax advantages. The welfare gain 
from a 2 p.p. reduction in the rate of inflation con'esponds to the sum of rectangle C 
and niangle D under the compensated housing demand curve in Figure 3, and can be 
expressed as: 
(11) 
where EHR is the absolute value of the compensated elasticity of housing demand with 
respect to the rental cost, and HA2 is the 1995 market value of owner-occupied 
housing with tax advantages (59.7 billion pesetas). By substituting previous values 
and estimates in equation (11), we have: 
GA = 0.41% of GDP 
In the case of owner-occupied housing without tax advantages, we can use equation 
(11) with R Wand HW instead of RA and HA, to get: 
GW = 0.14% of GDP 
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Adding up these figures, the resulting total welfare gain from the reduced distortion 
of owner-occupied housing demand is 0.55% of GDP. This estimate is five times 
Feldstein's (1997) calculation for the US, a sizable difference that reflects both the 
much higher ratio of housing values to GDP and the enormous implicit subsidy that 
tax rules and inflation give to the purchase of owner-occupied houses in Spain. With 
actual taxes and inflation, the rental cost for owner-occupiers with tax advantages in 
1995 was around 51 % of the no-tax user cost (76% in the US and 71 % in the UK), 
and a 2 p.p. reduction in inflation would increase the rental cost of owner-occupied 
housing by nearly 7% (4.8% in the US and 4.2% in the UK). 
Inflation and taxes also distort the demand for non-owner occupied housing. 
In this case, the rental cost can be written as: 
where we assume a m011gage-to-value ratio of 11=30%. Note that here there are no 
tax credits nor interest deductions, and propel1y taxes are not deductible. The 
resulting cost is RN2= 12.1 %. A 2 p. p. reduction in inflation raises the rental cost to 
RN1=12.42% through its effect on the return of alternative investments. Computing 
the analog of expression (11) we obtain a welfare gain of: 
GN = 0.01 % of GDP 
Houses may be demanded as an investment: landlords buy residences and rent 
them out. When this is the case, interest, depreciation, property taxes and maintenance 
costs are deductible without limit. The user cost of rental sector houses is: 
(13) 
With an assumed mortgage-to-value ratio of 11=20%, RR2=8.64%. A 2 p.p. reduction 
in inflation increases the rental cost to RR1=9.18%, \\'hich in turn implies a welfare 
gain of: 
GR = 0.13% of GDP 
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All in all, the value of the aggregate welfare gain from reduced distortions on 
housing implied by a 2 p.p. reduction in the rate of inflation is: 
G2 = GA + GW + GN + GR = 0.69% ofGDP 
2.2.2. Welfare Revenue Effects from Lov,'er Inflation 
Given the imp0l1ance of the tax-inflation distol1ions and the composition of 
the housing stock, the revenue effects implied by a 2 p.p. reduction in the inflation 
rate are expected to be sizable and concentrated in the owner-occupied sector. 
Consider the effect of the inflation reduction upon the stock of owner-occupied 
housing with tax advantages (from HA2 to HAJ): 
that is, a decline of 3.5 billion pesetas, from HA2=59.7 billion pesetas to HAt=56.2 
billion pesetas. 
On the assumption that housing capital shifts to the business sector, there are 
as many as six different channels through which the change in housing demand 
affects government revenues. 
First, net property tax payments are reduced by: 
L/ l-Lh) z~ HA = -0.0066 billion pesetas 
Second, as both mortgage interest rates and the housing stock decline, the amount of 
deductible interest payments falls, thus increasing net revenues by: 
Third, the tax credit on housing purchases declines. If the shift of capital out of the 
housing sector were instantaneous, the net revenue increase would be d~HA, or in 
annuity terms: 
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-id.1.HA = 0.0499 billion pesetas 
where i is the investor's discount rate (i=9.5%). Fourth, taxes paid on imputed 
housing rentals fall by: 
'[hPAHA = -0.0098 billion pesetas 
Fifth, as housing capital shifts to the business sector, revenues from taxes on capital 
income increase by: 
-(0.119-0.0772)AHA = 0.1463 billion pesetas 
where the expression in brackets is the difference between the pre-tax return to 
business investment and the after-tax retum to savings when the rate of inflation is 
2 p.p. lower. Finally, it should be noted that additional revenues arising from business 
investment must include sales and VAT taxes, an effect which can be estimated 
as(23): 
-0.361'[ .1.HA = 0.2022 billion pesetas 
s 
where Ts= 16% is the standard VAT rate. The total revenue gain is thus: 
dREV A = 0.7012 billion pesetas = 1.01% of GDP 
In the case of owner-occupiers without tax advantages, the revenue gain is 
much smaller, given the absence of tax credits and m0l1gages outstanding. The 
reduction in the housing stock is 3.4% or AHW=-2.3 billion pesetas. Revenue losses 
from reduced imputation taxes and propelty taxes are 0.0064 and 0.0044 billion 
pesetas, respectively. Additional business taxes yield 0.0961 billion pesetas, and new 
VAT taxes can be estimated in 0.1328 billion pesetas. The ensuing net revenue effect 
IS: 
(23) New business investment generates additional sales and value added, which 
in turn implies more revenues in an amount that could be non-negligible. Note that 
value added, VA, equals capital income, pK, plus wages, W. Given a fixed labour 
income share W=0.66VA, V AIK=3.03 p=36.1 % of the additional capital stock per 
year when p=11.9%. New business capital of 3.5 billion pesetas aIising from the 
owner-occupied sector would generate 1.2635 billion pesetas of value added per year. 
With a VAT tax rate of 16% this translates into 0.2022 billion pesetas per year of 
additional revenue, or 0.29% of GDP per year. 
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dREV w = 0.2181 billion pesetas = 0.31% of GDP 
The overall size of the revenue gain from the interaction of lower inflation and the 
tax treatment of owner-occupied housing is quite large: almost three times Feldstein's 
estimate for the US and as much as five times the UK's figure(24). However, there 
should be little surpl;se once we recall the size of the tax-inflation subsidy to owner-
occupied housing and the popularity of home ownership in Spain: the net per capita 
stock in 1992 was $26,600, 27% higher than Germany's stock, 31 % larger than the 
US figure and 67% higher than the per capita stock in the UK (see Bakhshi and 
others, 1997, and Toedter and Ziebarth, 1997). 
Tuming to the non-owner-occupied sector (second residences and empty 
houses), the revenue effect is the result of two opposing changes: a transfer of capital 
to the business sector -which yields additional business taxes and VAT revenues- and 
a revenue loss from lower property taxes and imputation taxes. The reduction in the 
stock of houses is 2.3%, or i\HN=-0.20 billion pesetas. The additional revenues 
arISIng from the business sector are calculated as -[(0.119-
0.0772)+0.36 hsJ i\HN=O.O 199 billion pesetas. The change in property taxes is 
't'pzi\HN=-0.0007 billion pesetas and the loss of imputation taxes is't'hPzi\HN=-
0.0006. The resulting net revenue gain is: 
dREV N = 0.0186 billion pesetas = 0.03% of GDP 
Consider lastly the rental sector. Given an increase in the user cost of 0.54 
p.p., the implied decline in demand is -5.3% or i\HR=-1.15 billion pesetas. 
The revenue impact is fivefold: 1) Increased revenue fi'om business investment: -
(0.119-0.0772)1.15=0.0481 billion pesetas; 2) Additional revenue from VAT taxes:-
0.36 I (0.16)(1.15)=0.0664 billion pesetas; 3) Loss of interest deductions: 
0.2(0.108x21.7-0.088x20.55)=0.0455 billion pesetas; 4) Loss of maintenance and 
depreciation deductions: -'t'h(m+8) i\ HR=0.0215 billion pesetas; 5) Loss of property 
taxes: Z't'p(l-'t'h) i\HR=-O.0022 biIJion pesetas. The revenue effect from all these sources 
IS: 
(24)For homogeneity, this comparison does not include sales or VAT taxes. 
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dREV R = 0.1793 billion pesetas = 0.26% of GDP 
The overall revenue change through all s0l1s of housing demand is the sum of the 
fOlmer effects: 
dREV2 = dREV A + dREV w + dREV N + dREV R = 
= 1.1172 billion pesetas = 1. 60% of GDP 
It should be noted that 70% of this revenue gain comes from two sources: additional 
VAT taxes (0.59% of GDP) and loss of interest deductions (0.52% of GDP). 
In order to calculate the welfare effects of the above revenue gain we have to 
multiply it by A. For A=O.4, it yields 0.64% of GDP, and for A=I.5, 2.40% of GDP. 
As can be seen, the welfare revenue gains are quite significant by themselves.Relative 
to the direct welfare gains, they are roughly similar for low values of the marginal 
deadweight loss and more than three times as high for high values (see row 4 in 
Table 3). 
Finally, the net welfare gain atising from the effects of a 2 p.p. reduction in 
inflation upon the housing market is the sum of the direct gain from the reduced 
dist0l1ion and the indirect welfare gain associated with the resulting revenue gains: 
NG2 =G2 + AdREV2 = (0.69+A1.60)%of GDP 
The overall gain is 1.33% of GDP for A=O.4 and 3.09% of GDP for A=1.5 (see row 
4 in Table 3). Not surplisingly, given our previous explanations of the magnitude of 
the subsidy to owner-occupied housing and of the size of the housing stock in Spain, 
the net welfare gain is quite large: around six times the figures of the US. 
Needless to say, there are margins of uncertainty in our calculations. In this 
respect, two key parameter values are the housing demand elasticity and the 
mOl1gage-value ratio in the owner-occupied tax-advantaged sector. Suppose that the 
mOl1gage-value ratio were 11=25% instead of the maintained 11=50%. The resulting 
overall direct gain would fall by 0.1 % of GDP to 0.59%, still a sizable improvement. 
Revenue gains would decline to 1.29% of GDP from 1.6%, which in turn implies a 
net welfare gain of 1.11 % of GDP for A=O.4 and 2.52% of GDP for A=I.5. Assume, 
in addition to 11=25%, that the hue value of EHR were 0.45 instead of 0.90. The net 
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gain in this case would be 0.84% of GDP for ),=0.4 and 2.00% of GDP for ).=1.5. 
Therefore, although halving both J.l and EHR reduces our reference estimates by about 
35%, it still leaves welfare gains far larger than those found in the US. 
2.3. Inflation and tlte Demand for Money 
2.3.1. Welfare Effects of Distorting Afoney Demand 
Perhaps the best-known source of welfare losses resulting from inflation 
relates to the dist0l1ions on money demand. As established in the seminal work of 
Bailey (1956), an increase in inflation increases the oppOliUnity cost of holding 
money by raising interest rates, and reduces the level of money holdings relative to 
the social optimum. This effect ("shoe leather costs") makes inflation socially costly 
because, as Fliedman (1969) noted, money holdings are optimal only when the 
nominal interest rate is zero, thus equating the marginal utility and the (zero) social 
marginal cost of money. Consequently, any increase in an already positive nominal 
interest rates tends to lower the level of money holdings further below the optimum. 
Assuming an initial situation characterized by inflation (1t2) and a positive 
nominal interest rate (in2 = ro2 + 1tJ, reducing inflation entails a welfare gain. As 
shown in Figure 4, which plots the demand for money as a function of the nominal 
interest rate, a reduction in inflation (from rr2 to rr l) leads to an increase in money 
demand (from M2 to M1) and to a welfare gain represented by the area C plus D 
between the money demand curve and the zero opportunity cost line. As can be seen, 
the size of the gain crucially hinges on the interest elasticity of money demand. 
To compute the welfare gain it is necessalY to estimate the change induced by 
the reduction in inflation on nominal interest rates, and the induced increase in money 
demand (M1-M2). At a "hue" initial inflation rate (rr2) of 2% (3.5-15), the net-of-tax 
retum on the debt-equity p0l1folio in Spain (ro2) is 7.31 %, thus leading to a nominal 
interest rate (io2) of 9.31 % (7.31 +2). When the "tIlle" inflation rate (rrl) is zero (1.5-
1.5), then the real and nominal net-of-tax return (rnl = in!) becomes 7.72% since 
dr/drr =-0.21. Thus the welfare gain cOlTesponding to the area C+D in the Figure is: 
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= 0.0772 [1 + 0.5 (0.0931-0.0772)](M1-M2) 
1 
= -0.08515eM M __ (0.0159)GDP 
(19) 
rn+n 
= -0.00135e,,~ (r +n)-I GDP 
"'GDP n 
In Spain, the long-run interest-rate elasticity of money demand (EM) is 
estimated to be roughly 0.2, and in 1995 non-interest-bearing money balances 
amounted to 8,930 biIlion pts, or 12.8% of GDP (M). Substituting these values into 
equation (13) yields a total welfare gain of 
G3 = 0.04% of GDP 
As can be seen, the size of the welfare gain associated with the changes in 
money demand (Bailey effect) is rather smaIl, although almost twice that in the US. 
This is mainly due to the money-to-income ratio being twice as large in Spain. 
2.3.2. Welfare Revenue Effects of Changes in Money Demand 
Following Feldstein (1996), the reduction in inflation leads to changes in 
government revenue through several channels: the loss of seigniorage associated with 
the lower 'tax' on money holdings (the Phelps effect); the loss due to the portfolio 
shift from other productive assets to money balances; and the gain related to the 
one-time replacement of interest-bearing government debt by higher money balances. 
These sources of revenue changes are examined in what follows. 
The marginal change in seigniorage induced by a unit reduction in inflation 
is shown in Feldstein (1996) to equal: 
dSeign/drt = M + rt (dMldrt) = MlGDP [I-EM d(rn + rt)/drt)(rt/rn +rt)]GDP = 
= 0.1236 GDP 
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Thus, the loss of seigniorage will be (0.02)(0.1236)GDP = 0.25% of GDP. As 
in the US, the Phe1ps revenue effect is higher than the Bailey money demand effect. 
As concerns the revenue loss from shifting capital (taxed) to money balances 
(non-taxed), since the reduction in productive capital is equal to the increase in 
money balances, we have that 
When these assets are invested in productive capital they earn a real pre-tax 
return of 11.9% but a net-of-tax return of only 7.72%. The difference between them 
is the combined effective tax rate at the corporate and personal levels. Applying this 
difference to the reduction in productive capital gives a revenue loss of (0.119-
0.0772)0.0044 of GDP = 0.02% of GDP. 
Concerning the substitution of increased money balances for government debt, 
this implies a one-time reduction of the stock of government debt and thus a 
permanent reduction in debt service. Taking a value for the nominal interest on 
government debt (rDJ of 8.5% in 1995, a value for the personal tax rate (8J of 0.3, 
and a true inflation rate in 1995 of 2.8%, the real net-of-tax interest rate on 
government debt would be (1-0.3)8.5%-2.8% = 3.2%, and the reduced debt service 
in perpetuity rng(M j -M2) = 0.01% of GDP. 
Combining the three revenue effects above yields a total revenue loss 
dREV3 = -0.25-0.02+0.01 = -0.26% of GDP 
In welfare terms, the revenue loss depends on the assumed value of the 
marginal deadweight loss, amounting to 0.10% of GDP for ).=0.4, and 0.39% of GDP 
for ).=1.5. 
On the basis of the above calculations, the total welfare gain (direct welfare 
plus indirect welfare revenue effects) can be estimated as: 
NG) = G3 + ). dREV3 = 0.00037 GDP - ),0.0026 GDP 
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For ),=0.4, this yields -0.07% of GDP, and for ),=1.5, -0.35% of GDP. 
As can be seen, reducing inflation implies overall a welfare loss through the 
money demand channel. The reason is that the welfare losses arising from the lost 
revenue more than outweight the welfare gains resulting from the reduced distOltion 
of money holdings: ie., the Phelps effect dominates the Bailey effect (see row 5 of 
Table 3). 
Finally, it is important to point out that all of the above estimates critically 
hinge on the value taken for the interest-elasticity of money demand. According to 
Lucas (1994), the money demand curve becomes infinitely elastic for sufficiently low 
nominal interest rates. Thus we would be seriously underestimating the direct welfare 
gain from reducing the distortion on money demand. On the contrary, according to 
Mulligan and Sala-i-Martin (1996), we would be seriously overestimating the direct 
welfare gain if it is the case -as the authors cIaim- that money demand becomes 
completely interest-rate-inelastic for sufficiently low nominal interest rates. 
UnfOltunately, the empirical work on money demand functions in Spain is based on 
linearity assumptions and it is not yet possible to know whether we are under- or 
overestimating the direct welfare gain on money holdings. 
2.4. Debt Service and tire Govemment Budget Constraint 
This final item relates to the higher cost of servicing the national debt that 
results ti:om a reduction in inflation of 4 p.p. This happens because inflation does not 
alter the real pre-tax interest rate on govemment debt while the inflation premium is 
taxed at the personal level. If the debt-to-income ratio is to be kept constant, then an 
increase in taxes is required. This, in turn, implies welfare costs insofar as taxes are 
dist0l1ionary. 
As shown in Feldstein (1996), in equilibrium the revenue loss resulting from 
lower inflation can be approximated as the product of the change in inflation (d1t), 
the effective tax rate (8J and the debt-to-income ratio (b): 
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Consideling that in Spain Om is 30%, and that the relevant(25) debt-to-GDP 
ratio is 40% (once we exclude debt in the hands of both foreign investors and tax-
favoured institutional investors), the revenue change is: 
dREV4 = -(0.02)(0.3)(0.4) = -0.24% of GDP 
In turn, the net welfare revenue is: 
NG4 = -0.24A 
which yields -0.10% of GDP for A = 0.4, and -0.36% of GDP for A = 1.5 (see row 
6 of Table 3). These figures are in line with those obtained for the US. 
2.5. Total benefits 
Table 3 summaIizes our estimates of the pelmanent annual benefits that can 
be obtained when moving from low intlation to price stability in Spain. As can be 
seen fi'om the last three rows of the table, the total welfare effect is in all cases 
positive and sizable, ranging fi'om 1.71 % to 2.87% of GDP(26). 
While the values presented in the table cOlTespond to different assumptions 
regarding the marginal deadweight loss per peseta of additional revenue (A) and the 
interest elasticity of saving (fl), some of these assumptions are more plausible than 
others. In particular, the empirical evidence available for Spain suggests that A is very 
close to 0.4, and that fl is somewhere between 0-0.2. Under this more realistic 
scenario, the annual welfare benefits are estimated to be st111 quite significant, ranging 
from 1.71 to 1.88% of GDP. 
(25) If debt holders are tax-exempt to begin with, then there are no revenue losses. 
(26) It could be claimed that we are not taking into account the welfare losses 
resulting from the need to raise distortionary taxation to finance the revenue shortfall 
and higher unemployment compensation payments stemming from the lower output 
-transitorily or pelTtlanently- induced by the disintlation process and discussed in 
Section 1 of the paper. In the case of Spain, our calculations show that this would 
amount, on welfare te lTtlS , to less than 0.1 % of GDP in the more realistic scenario of 
A=O.4, and to 0.3% of GDP when A=I.S. These calculations are available upon 
request. 
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As can be seen, the four types of effects considered in the table contribute 
quite differently towards the total net welfare effect. \Vhile the changes induced by 
lower inflation on retirement consumption and housing demand contlibute favourably 
to the total welfare effect, the induced changes in money demand and in the cost of 
servicing the public debt make a negative contribution. Under the most realistic 
scenario, the first two factors amount to 1.88-2.05% of GDP, and the other two to 
-0.17% of GDP. 
Another interesting feature is that both the direct welfare effect and the 
indirect welfare revenue effect are positive when we aggregate over the four 
economic categories in the table. Nevel1heless, it should be observed that the 
traditional direct welfare effect is significantly higher than the indirect effect. For 
instance, under the more realistic scenario, the direct effect ranges from 1.52 to 
1.64% of GDP, while the indirect effect ranges from 0.20 to 0.25% of GDP. So, 
while the conceptual framework employed in the paper has clearly gained from the 
inclusion of the indirect revenue effects together with the traditional direct welfare 
effects, under our more realistic scenalio this does not seem empirically to make a 
big difference. 
Finally, it is w011h mentioning that the net welfare gains of achieving price 
stability increase with the marginal deadweight loss and with the interest elasticity 
of saving. One reason is that since a reduction of inflation increases total revenue, it 
allows other distol1ionary taxes to be reduced. Thus the larger the marginal 
deadweight loss per peseta of additional revenue, the higher the welfare revenue gain. 
The other reason is that the more interest-elastic saving is, the larger the favourable 
effect of a reduction in inflation on the amount of retirement consumption purchased 
by individuals and the lower the revenue loss. 
Table 4 presents the values of the underlying variables and parameters used 
in evaluating the benefits of going to price stability in Spain (and in the US), and 
Table 5 presents a compalison of our results with those obtained by Feldstein (1997) 
for the US within the same conceptual framework. For the sake of comparability, we 
take ),,=0.4 and T}=O, which correspond to our more realistic scenario. As can be seen 
by looking at the last row, the total net welfare gain is almost three times larger in 
Spain (1.71 % of GDP) relative to the US (0.65% of GDP). This is mostly due to the 
very different net gains associated with the effect of a reduction in inflation on the 
demand for housing (1.33% of GDP in Spain for 0.22% in the US). For the other 
NI96026.M\fM 34 
three economic categOlies, the gains are remarkably similar, as can be seen in the last 
column of the table. According to our analysis, the much larger effects of reduced 
inflation on housing demand in the case of Spain mainly reflect the much higher ratio 
of housing values to GDP in our case and the enOlmous implicit subsidy that tax 
rules and inflation give to the purchase of owner-occupied houses. Of course, both 
factors are deeply intenelated from a general equiliblium viewpoint. 
3. COSTS AND BENEFITS COMPARED 
3.1. Benefits mill liS costs 
The most important difficulty with which economists are faced when 
examining the costs and benefits of moving from low inflation to price stability is the 
absence of a fully satisfactory general equilibrium theory of money. In this paper, we 
have followed the more pragmatic route of combining a macroeconomic estimate of 
the costs and a microeconomic estimate of the benefits of achieving price stability in 
Spain within an admittedly partial equilibrium framework. Rather than trying to 
identify and quantify all of the various channels through which the inflationary 
process entails costs and benefits, we have focused only on those channels that we 
think are most imp0l1ant. 
Table 6 sununarizes our estimates of both the costs and the benefits of 
achieving price stability in Spain. As regards the costs, we have relied on estimates 
of the saclifice ratio to arrive at a rough figure for how costly it is to move to price 
stability in telms of lost output. We have concluded that in Spain such costs are 
equivalent to 0.6 to 1 % of GDP per year on a permanent basis. As regards the 
benefits, we have adopted Feldstein's (1996) approach and focused on the interactions 
between inflation and capital income taxation. Since inflation leads to increases in the 
effective rate of capital income taxation in non-fully indexed tax systems, it distorts 
consumption-saving decisions and asset allocation decisions, resulting in welfare 
losses. Our empirical estimates of the welfare gains to be obtained from achieving 
price stability in Spain -shown in Table 3- are quite sizeable by international 
standards, ranging from 1.7 to 2.9% of GDP per year on a permanent basis, 
depending on the assumptions made about the marginal deadweight loss of raising 
revenue and the interest elasticity of saving. In what we consider to be the more 
realistic scenario, the benefits are estimated to be 1.7 to 1.9% of GDP per year on a 
JV196026.MMM 35 
pelmanent basis. Consequently, the net benefit (benefit minus costs) of going from 
low inflation to price stability in Spain is estimated to be -in the more realistic 
scenario- 0.7 to 1.3% of GDP per year on a pelmanent basis. Thus, according to our 
preliminary results, achieving price stability seems to be a worthwhile enterprise. 
Given that our paper applies Fe1dstein's (1996) methodology to Spain, it is 
useful to compare our results to those obtained by this author for the US. If we take 
Feldstein's more realistic scenario, then the estimated output costs of achieving price 
stability in the US are equivalent to 0.16% of GDP per year on a permanent 
basis(271, while the estimated benefits are 0.6-1 % of GDP per year on a permanent 
basis. This yields an annual net benefit of 0.5-0.8% of GDP, which is similar 
although somewhat smaller than the 0.7-1.3% of GDP that we find for Spain. 
Excluding the revenue effects from VAT taxes, which do not exist in the US, the 
annual net benefit for Spain would fall to 0.5-1.0% of GDP, which is almost identical 
to the US range of estimates. 
The similality between the estimated net benefits of achieving price stability 
in Spain and the US is rather sniking considering the velY significant differences in 
their respective economic structures and tax systems. Still, it happens to be the case 
that while the costs of achieving price stability are significantly higher in Spain so 
are the benefits, thus leading to net benefits of the same order of magnitude in both 
cases. 
3.2. Some Caveats 
As emphasized earlier, our calculations of the net benefits of going from low 
inflation to price stability are based on a relatively simple partial equilibrium 
framework. Still, even if we keep to the methodology that we hav~ followed there are 
a number of factors that should be mentioned to get some idea of the margin of 
uncertainty of our cost and benefit estimates. 
Regarding the costs, since our simple macromodel is linear it does not take 
into account the possibility -often mentioned- that the Phillips curve becomes flatter 
(27) While Feldstein finds the output costs of disinflation to be transitory in the 
US, the figure mentioned in the text corresponds to an annuity which has the same 
present value as the cumulative transitory output costs. 
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as the inflation rate gets lower, thus making it costlier to achieve a given reduction 
in inflation(28). While there is no empilical evidence on this issue in the Spanish 
case, if the above cliticism were valid we would be underestimating the true output 
costs of further reducing inflation. This is, nevertheless, not the only -nor possible the 
most imp0l1ant- source of bias in our estimate of the costs of reducing inflation. 
Indeed, it could seliously be claimed that we have overestimated the output costs of 
achieving further disinflation in Spain since anti-inflationary policies are now more 
credible and the degree of downward wage and plice flexibility higher than in the 
past. While it is hard to assess which of the two biases is likely to be larger, the 
recent perfonnance of the Spanish economy indicates that the disinflation process has 
tended to become easier in recent years, even as the inflation rate has been 
progressively lowered. This would suggest that, if anything, we may have empilically 
overestimated -rather than underestimated- on balance the true output costs of 
achieving plice stability in Spain today. 
As regards the benefits, by focusing on the interaction between inflation and 
capital income taxation, we have omitted other interactions with the tax system that 
could lower our estimated welfare gains from reducing inflation. In particular, as 
noted by Persson, Persson and Svensson (1996), shifting to a lower rate of inflation 
has a pelmanent negative effect on tax revenues due to incomplete or delayed 
indexation of the transfer payment system, and partial indexation of personal income 
tax brackets in progressi\'e tax systems. Against this, it can be argued that with a 
lower inflation rate there is also a pennanent increase in the real value of the tax 
revenues collected, insofar as tax collection lags behind the actual generation of 
income. While we have not attempted to make such estimates for Spain, the evidence 
presented by Persson, Persson and Svensson for Sweden suggests that, overall, our 
benefits could be overestimated. 
On the other hand, there are also a number of benefits associated with 
loweling inflation that have nothing to do with the tax system and which have not 
(28) As recently suggested by Akerlof, Dickens and Perry (1996), reaching an 
inflation rate which is low enough to be consistent with plice stability may deprive 
policymakers of the possibility of achieving the real wage cuts that are needed for the 
economy to perfOlm adequately. Yet, it is unclear to us why those real wage cuts may 
not also be obtained through nominal wage cuts in an environment where price 
stability prevails. Furthennore, it could be argued that in countries with wage 
indexation mechanisms -like Spain-, going to a low enough rate of inflation leads to 
a deactivation of such mechanisms, thus improving real wage flexibility. 
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been considered in our analysis, like the saving from not having constantly to revise 
prices (menu cost), the more efficient allocation of resources which comes with lower 
-and thus generally more stable- inflation rates, and the redistribution of income and 
wealth in favour of those with fewer resources to protect themselves against inflation. 
While these benefits are quite hard to quantify reliably, they may nevertheless be 
significant. 
It is evident from the above that it is rather difficult at this stage to ascertain 
the net effect of the various factors mentioned regarding the net benefits of going 
from low inflation to price stability. Nevertheless, it is comf0l1ing to know that the 
sources of bias might, to some extent, cancel each other out. 
Another word of caution concems the considerations relating to the time 
profile of costs and benefits in our calculations. Regarding the costs, timing 
consideration have been taken fully into account when computing in Section 2 the 
'cost annuity' which is equivalent in present value to the transitory output losses 
resulting from disinflation. Nevertheless, regarding the benefits we have followed 
Feldstein (1996) in assuming that all the adjustments to the new equilibrium with 
price stability take place instantaneously, and thus that the 'steady state' benefits are 
obtained from year 1. Thus, if it tumed out to be the case that these adjustments take 
several years to be completed, this would reduce the estimated 'benefit annuity'. This 
effect might be particularly relevant in the case of the demand for housing given the 
structural characteristics of the housing market. Since the reduced housing dist0l1ion 
accounts for three-quarters of the estimated total welfare gain of 1.7-1.9% of GDP 
per year in our more realistic scenario (see Table 3), this downward revision might 
be non-negligible. 
In order to assess how important these time profile considerations are, we have 
considered how our net benefit calculations would be affected if, for example, the 
benefits stemming from housing demand were to occur, say, only after 5 or 10 years 
rather than instantly. If we take, for simplicity, the more realistic scenario of i..=O.4 
and ,,=0.0, 0.2, our findings are that the benefits are always higher than the costs in 
the five year case, while in the ten year case annual benefits range from 1-1.1 % of 
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GDP relative to costs of 0.6-1 % of GDP(29). Consequently, it would seem that our 
conclusions would continue to hold even when considering significant delays in the 
benefits accruing from housing. 
To check how robust our results are, we have carried out sensitivity analysis 
by allowing some of the parameters to take a range of values containing those 
reference estimates considered in the main text(30). In particular, we have specified 
the following ranges for the key parameters Tl, EHR, ).. and 11: Tl=O.O, 0.1, ... , 0.4; 
E HR=0.5, 0.6, ... ,0.9; A=O.4, 0.5, .. , 1.5; and 11= 0.25 and 0.50. These ranges give rise 
to 600 possible calculations of net benefits (benefits minus costs) which have been 
tabulated in Table 7 for three altemative values ofT (the number of years after which 
the housing benefits accrue). As can be seen from the table, insofar as the housing 
benefits start accruing within the first five years, it is vel)' likely that the benefits of 
going to price stability will continue to exceed the costs. 
A criticism that can be made regarding our conclusions is that since the 
welfare benefits from lower inflation could be obtained altematively through first-best 
tax-reform at an unchanged rate of inflation, it is fiscal policy rather than monetary 
policy that should be adjusted to reap the ensuing welfare gains. The problem is, 
however, that in practice it is vel)' difficult to foresee such a radical tax reform as a 
result of well-known political economy problems. 
In the same vein, it could be argued that once disinflationary demand policies 
have been undertaken -and the output costs being bom-, if there were a future 
tax-reform of the sort described above, there would be then no more benefits to reap 
from having achieved price stability after such reform is in place, thus leading to an 
unfavourable 'ex post' relationship between benefits and costs. A reply to this would 
be that, insofar as a fully comprehensive tax reform doesn't come very early in time, 
it will still be worthwhile to undertake demand policies oriented towards price 
(29) In particular, the benefits (B) will be larger than the costs CC) in annuity terms 
if B = X R + X H e·pT > C, where X R are the annual benefits other than housing and X H 
are the annual housing benefits stal1ing to accrue after T years (T=5, 10). 
(30) While, for the sake of comparability with the other country studies contained 
in this volume, we have omitted in our benefits calculations summarized in Table 3 
the impact of the net revenue losses arising from the output costs due to disinflation 
(ie. payments for unemployment compensation), these nevertheless were taken into 
account when elaborating Table 7. 
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stability. In fact, for Spain we have calculated that, in the case of temporalY output 
costs -which are born mainly during the first five years-, going to price stability 
would be justified on benefit-cost grounds insofar as the tax reform does not happen 
during the first six years. For the case where the output costs are pennanent, going 
to price stability would be justified insofar as the tax reform does not take place 
during the first eleven years. 
To conclude, it is evident from the above paragraphs that our cost-benefit 
analysis of achieving plice stability in Spain is merely a very rough and preliminary 
attempt to study a very complex phenomenon. Still, since it captures some of what 
are generally considered to be the most imp0l1ant costs and benefits it is a useful 
stal1ing point. According to our empilical results, going from low inflation to price 
stability in Spain seems to be a w0I1hy enterplise, yielding a net beneficial effect of 
0.7 to 1.3% of GDP per year in the more reasonable scenarios. 
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Sample peIiod 
1964:1 - 1970:1 
1970:2 - 1973:3 
1973:4 - 1979:2 
1979:3 - 1986: 1 
1986:2 - 1991:4 
1992:1 - 1994:1 
1992:1 - 1995:4 
Table 1 
Summary Statistics 
Unemployment Inflation 
- -
u su n s" 
1,23 0,25 6,20 3,65 
1,77 0,53 7,95 1,88 
4,70 1,79 16,90 3,13 
16,25 4,10 12,07 2,27 
18,33 1,94 6,08 9,15 
21,01 2,70 5,08 0,76 
22,05 2,36 4,85 0,65 
Sample 
correlation 
0,71 
0,71 
0,32 
-0,90 
-0,04 
-0,80 
-0,79 
Note: x denotes the sample mean and Sx the sample standard deviation (x = u, n) . 
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Table 2 
The output costs of moving to price stability 
(in % of GDP per year) 
Dolado, Lopez-Salido and Vega(1) (l996)-Spain 
Andres, Valles and Mesu'e (1996)-Spain 
BaIl (1996) - cross section of GEeD countIies 
This paper-Spain 
Note: (1) MonetaIist case. 
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1.0 
0.9 
1.1-1.7 
0,6-1.0 
Table 3 
The Net 'Velfare Effect of Achieving Price Stability 
(evaluated as a percent of GDP for an inflation reduction of 2 p.p.) 
Direct Effect of Welfare Effect of 
Source of change Reduced Revenue Change Total Effect 
Distortion ),,=0.4 ),,=1.5 ),,=0.4 ),,=1.5 
Consumption timing ,,=0 0.79 -0.24 -0.88 0.55 -0.09 
,,=0.2 0.91 -0.19 -0.72 0.72 0.19 
,,=0.4 1.03 -0.15 -0.56 0.88 0.47 
Housing Demand 0.69 0.64 2.40 1.33 3.09 
Money Demand 0.04 -0.10 -0.39 -0.07 -0.35 
Debt Service -0.10 -0.36 -0.10 -0.36 
Irotals T}=O 1.52 0.20 0.77 1.71 2.29 
.. 
,,=0.2 1.64 0.25 0.93 1.88 2.57 
,,=0.4 1.76 0.29 1.09 2.04 2.87 
Notes: 
T}: uncompensated interest rate elasticity of savings. 
)..: marginal deadweight loss per peseta of additional revenue. 
The shaded areas show what we consider to be the more realistic figures for 
Spain given the available evidence on ).. and T}. 
Table 4 
Underlying Variables and Parameters in the Evaluation of the 
Benefits of Going to Price Stability (Spain vs. US) 
VARlABLEWA~ETER 
Fiscal 
Average tax on corporations 
Marginal corportate income tax 
Marginal capital income tax on individuals 
Effective marginal tax on capital gains 
Rate of property tax 
Tax credit on value of the house 
Marginal deadweight loss 
Financial 
Pretax real return to capital in corporate sector 
Debt/capital in corporations 
Share of equity in individual's pOlifolio 
Interest paid on mOligage 
Value of owner occupied housing as a propOliion of GDP 
Cun-ency plus bank resen'es as a proportion of GDP 
Relevant Govt. debt as a propOliion of GDP 
MOligage as a proportion of the value of owner-occupied house 
Maintenance cost 
Rate of depreciation 
Macroeconomic 
Rate of growth of the wage bill 
Inflation average 
CUlTent inflation 
Inflation bias 
GDP growth 
Share of wages in GDP 
Saving of the young in percent of GDP 
Behavioural 
Elasticity of saving wrt real net of return 
Compensated elasticity of housing demand wrt rental pricing 
Elasticity of demand for money wrt interest rate 
Propensity to save 
Source: Fe1dstein (1996) and own elaboration. 
Spain 
23% 
35% 
26% 
11% 
1% 
15% 
004, 1.5 
11.9% 
50% 
66% 
10.8% 
184% .... 
12.8% 
40% 
50% 
2% 
2.2% 
2.8% 
5.6%(1985-95) 
3.5% (1996) 
1.5% 
2.5%(1964-95) 
66% 
14% 
0, 0.2, 0.4 
0.9 
US 
41% 
35% 
25% 
10% 
2.5% 
004, 1.5 
9.2% 
40% 
60% 
7.2% 
105% 
6.1% 
50% 
20-50% 
2% 
2% 
2.6% 
4.7%(1960-94) 
2.9% 
2.0% 
2.5%( 1970-94) 
75% 
9% 
0, 0.4, 1.0 
0.8 
0.2 
0.12 
Table 5 
Comparison of Net \Velfare Effects: Spain vs. US 
(evaluated as a percent of GDP for an inflation 
reduction of 2 p.p. where ,,=0 and A=O.4) 
Direct Revenue Total 
SPAIN US SPAIN US j SPAIN 
Consumption timing 0.79 0.73 -0.24 -0.17 0.55 
Housing Demand 0.69 0.1 0.64 0.12 . 1.33 
Money Demand 0.04 0.02 -0.10 -0.05 -0.07 
Debt Service -0.10 -0.10 -0.10 
Irotals 1.52 0.85 0.20 -0.21 1.71 
Note: US figures taken from Feldstein (1997). 
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US 
0.56 
0.22 
-0.03 
-0.10 
0.65 
Diference 
-0.01 
+ 1.11 
-0.04 
o 
+1.06 
Table 6 
Summary of Benefits and Costs of 
Achieving Price Stability in Spain 
Pelmanent annual benefits and costs of going from low inflation to price stability 
(evaluated as a percent of GDP for an inflation reduction of 2 p.p.) 
BENEFITS 
COSTS 
BENEFITS minus COSTS 
,,=0 
,,=0.2 
" =0.4 
,,=0 
,,=0.2 
,,=0.4 
A = 0.4 
1.71 
1.88 
2.04 
0.60-1.00 
0.71-1.1l 
0.88-1.28 
1.04-1.44 
A = 1.5 
2.29 
2.57 
2.87 
0.60-1.00 
1.29-1.69 
1.57-1.97 
1.87-2.27 
The shaded areas cOITespond to the scenario which seems to be more plausible for 
Spain on the basis of the available empirical evidence on ). and". 
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Mean value 
Median 
Percentage of cases 
when benefits larger 
than costs 
Table 7 
Sensitivity analysis 
(benefits minus costs, in % of GDP) 
T=O T=5 
0.62 , 1.09 0.12,0.53 
0.60 , 1.14 0.09 , 0.59 
94.1 , 100 64.7 , 92.8 
T=10 
-0.29 , 0.14 
-0.22 , 0.21 
37.7 ,53.6 
Note: In each pair of numbers, the first refers to the case of pelmanent output 
costs (l % of GDP per year in annuity telms) and the second to the case of 
transitory output costs (0.6% of GDP per year in annuity terms) 
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